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hypothesis of the worthiness is here addressed on the assumption that the current position held by a 
candidate should not play any role in the attainment of the habilitation. Splitting candidates into two 
roles and having controlled for age as a variable, the data was used to reveal that the indicators of 
quality of scientific production (H index for hard sciences and articles in top ranked journals for 
social sciences and humanities) are more frequently the best predictors. Though some limits of the 
present analysis are faced and illustrated, some critical points of this new institution are discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: A SYSTEM IN
THE PURSUIT OF NEW BALANCES 
ecruitment in Italian Universities. 
The Italian public administration 
started to face the problems 
associated with public expenditures beginning 
in the early 1990s. One of the key points at 
those times was to take control of the 
retirement system of employees and the 
recruitment efforts of new personnel in public 
administration positions. As such, 
universities, however, did not make an effort 
with respect to this initiative (Cavalli & 
Moscati, 2010), even though the 
implementation of ad hoc policies were not 
designed permanently. Since that time, 
though, a general assumption of frozen 
organization charts was established to 
regulate the systems. Rules and procedures of 
competition (concorsi) have often changed; 
sometimes even with decrees that were 
designed to change the mechanisms (Degli, 
Esposti, & Geraci, 2010). Nonetheless, 
besides financial sustainability, the political 
end has often been focused on efficiency and 
meritocracy. Examining previous decades of 
an open door policy of recruitment with a 
subsequent long period of a lack of 
competition, resulted in a juridical comparison 
similar to the French physics context 
(Pezzoni, Sterzi, & Lissoni, 2012) and ended 
with a demographic misbalance along with a 
reduction of productivity due to a lack of any 
relevant filters in the recruitment process.  
Now, as a result of this previous process, to 
enter the university’s professoriate system 
with a permanent position has become a step-
by-step process that is more difficult and, at 
the same time, even more uncertain. If in 
previous decades it was a matter of certainty 
that to enter with a tenured position was only 
a matter of time, now there is one more filter 
(the habilitation) that must be overcome. In 
any case, the previous tenure mechanism was 
more or less always the same following a 
traditional pattern: the maestro used his or her 
personal influence to give the post to his /her 
alumno, or pupil (Fassari, 2009; Pezzoni et 
al., 2012; Vaira, 2011).  In a more formal 
way, it could be argued that the personal 
influence described by Clark (1986) has 
always played a crucial role along with the 
current juridical mechanisms of concorsi.  
These complex rules established by the 
Napoleonic pattern were in many cases 
plagued with allegations of rigged 
competitions. Moreover, disciplines, rather 
than institutions, continued to play a strong 
role (Becher & Trowler, 2001; Lissoni, 
Mairesse, Montobbio, & Pezzoni, 2011). 
Despite the rumors and allegations about this 
pattern of donship and nepotism, a different 
sort of analyses had already been pursued 
from different perspectives focusing just on 
recruitment procedures and its possible 
aberrant practices (Rossi, 2012b; Nelken, 
2009; Paris, 2005).  
Under this scenario, the 240/2010 Law, also 
known as Gelmini Law, was established and 
individuals tried to change this existing 
paradigm. Gelmini Law contained harsher 
new conditions that made initially entering 
universities with a permanent position a 
tougher goal. Under this new law, the levels 
of position were reduced from three levels, 
full professors, associate professors, and 
assistant professors and replaced with only 
two levels, full and associate levels.  
Although the assistant professor positions 
may still be given, they are now only able to 
be awarded as fixed-term positions whose 
renewals (typically 3 plus 2 or 3 plus 3 years, 
respectively) should be tougher to maintain 
R 
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and is no longer considered simply a formality 
(previously passing from one level to another 
was only a question of time or seniority, and 
the amount of needed time could have been 
assumed as a proxy of personal success and 
influence).  
Now, these positions as assistant professors 
are expected to be even externally funded 
and/or based on national competitions. 
Unfortunately, until now the total amount of 
competition funds like FIRBs, and recently 
replaced SIRs, (both national research 
competitions for junior professors who are 
less than 40 years old) was not considered as a 
serous incentive when compared just to the 
mere necessities of renovations of the human 
resources.  
The Habilitation in Italy. The habilitation is 
now being established as a new institution in 
the Italian national context. Yet, habilitation is 
not a new mechanism in academic 
recruitment. It has been in practice for a 
number of years in Germany, where 
Habilitation is closer to what is now the new 
fixed-term assistant professorship.  
In that country, this is essentially a second 
PhD and is usually over a different topic from 
the original PhD’s dissertation (Enders, 2001). 
However, that version is very different from 
the Italian use of the term. 
More recently it has also been implemented 
in France (habilitation; Musselin, 2004) and is 
now being introduced in Spain (abilitación – 
that version had thresholds in order to actually 
pre-indicate who would probably have 
attained the positions –, more recently 
replaced by acreditación, that has no 
thresholds and looks to be more similar to the 
Italian case).  
Despite these similar terms, these systems 
are enacted very differently within each 
country and there is a lack of space for 
comparison within the context of this article.  
In Italy, the goal of this system is to provide 
the possibility for any candidate to become 
eligible to participate in future competitions 
(concorsi) for full professorship (first level) 
and associate professorships (second level) 
without even the attainment of idoneità 
(eligibility, or fit-for-the-job), a very common 
way to give positions to losing candidates of 
previous competitions with good scores. 
Being able to successfully compete in this 
kind of competition is a new hurdle to be 
overcome and whose successful output does 
not necessarily guarantee any sort of post. In a 
more formal way, habilitation could be 
described as a “tougher pool of candidate and 
selective examination” because there is one 
more step when compared to the 
competitions, thus making this recruitment a 
longer (in time) tournament (Musselin, 2004). 
At the same time, the process also looks to 
introduce some of the characteristics of the 
opt or out mechanism, especially at the 
associate level (Musselin, 2004), since people 
who have not a permanent position are 
compelled to get this habilitation in order to 
survive
1
.  
The evolution of the system needs more 
time to be completed and eventually more 
investigations to be conducted.  
                                                     
1 A probable example of this for the next years to 
come could be represented by fixed-term assistant 
professors who will not have all the possibility to 
enter as permanent. Since their positions will expire 
and they will be by that time around 40 years old or 
more, a relevant problem of employment will be to be 
overcome. Even for this, it can be hypothesized that 
actually the system could favor “semi-insiders” 
(people who are employees, even though not 
permanently) toward outsiders (people who are 
employees somewhere else or have less priority in the 
informal queue of recruitment, such as for post-docs).  
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Despite the manifest intention to introduce 
more meritocracy
2
 to the system, in a widely 
alleged deceitful collegialism system (Degli 
Esposti et al., 2010), the attempt to manage a 
complex demographic phase in academic 
personnel structure is probably the most 
urgent issue at stake. This institution is 
expected to provide contributions in the next 
few years as they move toward a general 
process of downsizing. In fact, strictly 
connected with the theme of habilitation, there 
is the question of organizational chart points 
or punti organico. This system is a 
comprehensive system of data to let any 
public university have, annually, and is a 
calculation of points to be spent for new 
recruitment (both scholars, managerial, and 
clerical personnel) in accordance with 
retirements, performing indicators, and 
financial conditions.  
Actually the punti organico system is the 
rationale that should assure the financial 
sustainability and the differentiation of 
universities in a more performance-led 
criterion. Therefore, habilitation within this 
framework should just be used as a filter to 
have fewer pretenders and to filter out those 
who do not reach some minimum level of 
requirements. Formally, habilitation does not 
play any further role. In fact, the total amount 
of habilitated per year should affect the same 
chances of recruitment. An examination of 
previous data revealed that for the year 2013, 
the Ministry has granted 445.5 points to all 
Italian public universities, which equals to 
about 445 positions as full professors or 636.3 
positions as associate professors or a 
                                                     
2
 Actually the main quest to have the best person in 
an opened position recalls the mertonian assumption 
of universalism whose one of the most empirical 
works were made by Scott Long (Long and Fox, 
1995; Long 1978). 
combination of the two (full professors equals 
1.0 point, associates 0.7). This is assuming 
that no further administrative staff would have 
been needed. Thus, this issue contains an 
essential question: reproduction, extinction, or 
prosperity of scientific (factions of) epistemic 
communities
3
. 
In this paper the first wave – the 2013 
second wave has just ended its submission 
phase – of habilitation is analyzed
4
 in order to 
get the first empirical evidence from who did 
participate in 2012 The data analysis for 
reviewing this results is divided into four 
sections.  Beginning with data set one, a 
description of the construction of the data set 
is offered.  In section two, technical questions 
regarding the dataset and reliability of the 
variables that were used are provided for the 
reader. An illustration of the Italian 
demographic pyramid follows in section three 
in order to provide the reader an oversight of 
the phenomenon of reproduction of scientific 
communities. Finally, section four provides 
both frequencies as well as an in depth 
analyses of an exploitation of the data. In 
particular, it describes a two-steps regression 
test that was conducted using the primary 
hypotheses of worthiness of the evaluations 
by insiders and outsiders by controlling for 
their respective ages as a variable. In this 
section, some additional illustrations about the 
rules are also provided in order to assist the 
reader in better understanding if, and to what 
                                                     
3
 As Pezzoni et al. (2012) pointed out, the list of 
scientific disciplines has changed over time according 
to bargaining between official representative of 
scholars and the ministry. Recently a policy of 
reduction of the number was pursued in order to 
avoid high fragmentation. 
4
 At the moment of data collection, only a small 
percentage of results have been released and so forth 
the universe of the phenomena is not given (epistemic 
communities are 179).  
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extent, the concept of worthiness can be 
applied. Finally, some critical, although 
preliminary and in progress, remarks about 
the new institution of the habilitation are 
offered in the conclusions section.  
2.  METHODOLOGY.  
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A UNIQUE 
DATASET: METHODOLOGICAL 
EXPLANATIONS 
Data about habilitation and its procedure, 
which is basically a research and scientific 
profile evaluation, are totally free and 
available. Nonetheless they are designed to be 
seen and not necessarily to be processed 
statistically. For this reason, a track of the 
construction of the dataset is provided in the 
following section followed briefly by a 
description of the variables used in the 
analysis.  
Available Data. Data about employees in 
Italian universities
5
 including both people 
who tried to get the habilitation and people 
who did not are publicly available. This 
information includes such demographics as 
first and last names, scientific sector, faculty, 
department, university affiliation, and position 
(full professor, associate professors, assistant 
professors (ricercatori), fixed-term assistant 
professors, and statistically minor contractual 
figures). However, gender (even though this 
could be inferred from their respective first 
names), age, or other indices of scientific 
performance are not provided at the individual 
level. Considering the recent reforms and 
fusions, the affiliations concerning 
                                                     
5
 Data about post-doc researchers or lecturers do not 
match and do not have temporal indications. For this 
reason, being all these weaker characters, they are 
considered “outsiders”.  
departments and faculties are problematic and 
were, therefore, not considered in this study.  
Conversely, in a different repository 
belonging to the Ministry, curriculum vitae of 
people who presented themselves for the 
habilitation in 2012 is available for review. 
These two sets of data, however, are not 
equivocal. For example, one segment of a 
university may have many employees who did 
not apply (for instance, full professors do not 
have many reasons to apply) whereas many 
other people may have applied without 
necessarily being affiliated with any Italian 
university, at least as an employee. To this 
latter subset, a large portion of these 
individuals are expected to be post-doctoral 
students, fixed-termed professors, employees, 
or other non-standard personnel working in 
other places (centers with main missions in 
research and development such as the 
National Research Council and the like).  
Considering that the fiscal code is not 
provided for both employees and candidates 
to habilitation, no simple merging of these 
two datasets could therefore be conducted. To 
this regard, names and surnames were pasted 
into unique strings using a final position 
number ranging from 1 to 14 that served to 
identify the scientific area of the person. 
Assuming that any employee could not stay in 
two areas and that few people may have 
applied for different sectors belonging to 
different areas (actually it happened, but 
numbers are very little), this simple device 
actually reduced the amount of homonyms. 
The actual number of identified homonyms 
was reduced to138 within both of the two 
large datasets (around 100.000 rows). These 
repeating names have therefore, been, 
disambiguated manually.  
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Also at this point, any matching identifiers 
have been considered valid, thus assuming 
that errors are almost absent. Moreover, non- 
matching names from habilitation dataset 
have also been considered external or outsider 
(variables from now on are labeled as who). 
The scientific standing of the latter cannot be 
assumed to be necessarily inferior of those 
who are insiders (see Table 5 for more 
information). A final consideration is the 
indispensable social capital
6
 of the externals 
that can be assumed to be inferior due to, 
either separately or conjointly, and included 
both age and distance from the academic 
communities.  
For clarity, a description of the construction 
of the matrix is now provided
7
. A dataset 
composed of employees in academia, [A] was 
matched to a dataset made up of 
“applications” X “attributes concerning the 
single application” called [B]. [B] has more 
observations than the actual number of 
persons involved, since a person has the right 
to apply to more sectors and/or levels 
(associate and full).  
At this point a merging [A] ∪ [B], called 
[C], was done: this step has 93040 
observations deriving from 58060 ([B]) 
applications and 57518 employees ([A]). 
Total is less than the sum of rows because 
                                                     
6
 Pezzoni et al. (2012) refers and stresses the concept 
of credit and operationalize it in a different research 
design with data concerning for instance the scientific 
collaborations. Here I don’t control for this variable 
but it is assumed that habilitation ought not to given 
or denied according to political capital. In fact 
habilitation is not a recruitment procedure but only a 
pre-selection. Moreover their design looks to be more 
viable for hard sciences and much less for humanities 
and social sciences, while my aim is to compare 
scientific disciplines.   
7
 The appendix show sources, list of variables used 
for this work and the diagram here designed.  
candidates who are employees in universities 
match. [C] has three main subjects: people in 
search of habilitation who are not employees 
called [C1] ([B – A]) made up of applications 
as observations; not-applying people who are 
employees [C2] made up of individuals as 
observation ([A-B]); applying people who are 
employees [C3] ([A ∩ B]), made up of 
applications as observation.  
This variable (called “who”) has then been 
considered relevant to understand to what 
extent the habilitation committees were 
impartial in affording the habilitation 
according to this affiliation status. Thus a 
consequential job was made in order to have a 
more homogenized dataset.  
A matrix [D] was elaborated having only 
persons as observations, making collapse rows 
that had the name text in  In order to store all 
of the previous information obtained, 358 
dummies (two for each scientific sector, that 
is, for each couple for the two levels of 
habilitations) were computed.  
So the sum of the rows per person provided 
the number of applications made by each 
individual. 
Once the results by candidates had been 
published, other processes were completed in 
order to insert the productivity variables. This 
step resulted in [F] providing a row for the 
analyzed privileges by scientific sector.  
Available Variables. For this study, the 
results of habilitation are not just provided as 
a list of dummy tables (e.g. has/has not 
attained the habilitation), but instead included 
three indicators of scientific productivity that 
are similar to other studies (Ginther & Kahn, 
2004). These variables added from the data 
concerning the evaluations of applications 
were separated between the hard sciences 
(areas from 1 to 9) and the soft sciences 
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(10 to 14
8
). The hard sciences include: (a) an 
H index (normalized by academic age
9
; (b) 
normalized number
10
 of articles; and (c) 
normalized number of citations. The soft 
sciences have: (a) normalized number of 
books; (b) normalized number of chapters in 
books and articles; and (c) normalized number 
of articles published in top ranked reviews
11
. 
In cases were curriculum vitaes were stored as 
pdf files, they were downloaded one by one 
and may have offered further information 
such as date of birth, number of projects led or 
coordinated, professorships held, or other 
salient information about possible further 
academic titles (fellowships, editorial 
memberships, etc.).  
Nonetheless, this last source of information, 
curriculum vitaes, was used only to ascertain 
the ages (for a total of around 7000 
observations) of the individuals, due to the 
difficulty obtaining this information using 
existing data sources. Regarding the reliability 
and validity of the data, the three indicators 
used in this study were assumed to have an 
                                                     
8
 Exceptions, not given here due to not-yet-resealed 
data concerning the following sectors, are: 8C1, 8E1, 
8E2 and 8F1 that don’t have bibliometric indices 
(they are Design and Architecture disciplines); 11E 
disciplines have bibliometrics (Psychological 
sectors).  
9
 For an in depth analysis of H index by age see 
Mannella and Rossi (2013).  
10
 Normalizations are basically referred to a measure 
of personal contribution to an output when the latter 
are signed by more persons.  
11
 Having been debated recently about the misuse of 
citation indices in social sciences, evaluation of 
research and habilitation in social sciences opted to 
use a general criteria of peer review. In this case, an 
attempt was made to discriminate general 
productivity – alleged to be in most of the cases of 
modest value, parochial and poor in originality and 
innovation – from a bargained list per sector of top-
ranked reviews.  
intrinsic validity of productivity and quality of 
research, while noting that they cannot tell 
about networks of collaborations (social 
capital for Pezzoni et al. 2012) nor 
specialization in topics (Leahey, Keith, & 
Crockett, 2010). The H indexes and articles in 
top-ranked journals were assumed to measure 
quite well the quality of scientific production, 
while the others can be assumed as a good 
proxy of productivity in terms of quantity of 
outputs, with uncertainty about its’ quality.  
3.  THE EMPLOYEES PYRAMID OF 
ITALIAN UNIVERSITIES 
The possibilities for new concorsi 
(competitions for permanent positions) are 
strictly associated with the current amount of 
professors now employed. Projections 
published by the Minister foster additional 
data about how many people are supposed to 
leave for retirement through 2016. This 
projection is based on the age of each person, 
since retirement is basically mandatory in 
higher education by age 70, regardless of the 
years accrued in service. 
An exception to this rule can be a 
professor’s claim for a two year extension in 
order to continue their work with full titles in 
their respective chairs. Lately, these 
procedures, however, are becoming 
increasingly difficult since applications for 
extensions are no longer a formal quest and 
whose decisions are no longer considered 
quite certainly affirmative. In fact, the last 
general law (240/2010) tried to reduce these 
phenomena even though no data was available 
about the impact of such a change. Moreover, 
it is even less certain the number of people 
who are applying for or who will apply in the 
future as a condition of pre-retirement.   
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Table 1 Indicators of Demographics by Some Scientific Sectors and Results of Habilitation  
(Selected Scientific Sectors are Among Those that Were Published First) 
 
  
total #  
of expected 
vacancies 
ratio of full prof.s 
over associate prof.s 
ratio of full prof.s over 
associates+ (permanent) 
assistant prof.s 
ratio of associates prof.s 
over (permanent) 
assistant prof.s 
ratio of attained 
habilitations in 1° level 
ratio of attained 
habilitations in 2° level 
habilitations attained 
(both levels) / expected 
vacancies (# persons) 
# of total attained 
habilitations 
(both levels) 
01/A4 32 1.0100 0,5260 1,0870 43,1% 39,4% 478,1% 153 
02/B1 54 0.6923 0,3172 0,8455 73,0% 78,1% 1042,6% 563 
02/B2 24 0.5400 0,2983 1,2346 71,2% 69,7% 1370,8% 329 
03/C1 53 0.8909 0,3443 0,6298 51,0% 51,7% 300,0% 159 
06/D3 49 0.8557 0,2660 0,4512 31,1% 41,5% 336,7% 165 
06/E1 38 1.0256 0,3980 0,6341 29,2% 37,3% 263,2% 100 
07/H1 10 0.5397 0,2482 0,8514 65,9% 52,5% 580,0% 58 
07/H3 8 0.8478 0,2977 0,5412 69,7% 76,6% 1025,0% 82 
07/H5 6 0.7872 0,3058 0,6351 62,1% 70,0% 883,3% 53 
08/A1 28 1.2273 0,5000 0,6875 34,9% 45,7% 303,6% 85 
08/B3 33 0.9425 0,3923 0,7131 50,0% 44,2% 218,2% 72 
09/H1 31 0.8920 0,3870 0,7662 36,9% 42,6% 877,4% 272 
11/A1 27 1.2083 0,4567 0,6076 38,8% 34,9% 292,6% 79 
11/A3 80 1.2333 0,5000 0,6818 34,5% 40,7% 266,3% 213 
11/A4 31 0.7143 0,3636 1,0370 45,0% 28,6% 458,1% 142 
11/C2 26 1.5952 0,7791 0,9545 37,6% 40,3% 442,3% 115 
11/C4 20 0.8983 0,3786 0,7284 30,4% 44,2% 605,0% 121 
12/B1 34 1.6289 0,5745 0,5449 56,1% 31,2% 264,7% 90 
13/A5 8 2.2143 0,8611 0,6364 63,4% 56,5% 812,5% 65 
14/C1 67 0.8392 0,3125 0,5934 37,8% 29,0% 267,2% 179 
Total of available 
data 
659 1.0291 0,4253 0,7430 48,1% 47,7% 469,7% 3095 
Total academic 
population 
54930 0.8996 0,3594 0,6653 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Source: own elaboration on MIUR data. Total academic population refers to all scientific sector (179); Total only to shown sectors 
Note 1: for assistant professors only permanent ones are given because the fixed-term assistant professors are still a decisive minority 
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Even though this phenomenon was definitely 
not traditionally common, some incidents may 
continue to occur and may have an impact 
even if the smallest level of epistemic 
community is taken into account (few 
numbers count a lot in lower layers). 
Despite all of these caveats, a gross and 
rounded up number of new positions that can 
be used in the next few years – more or less 
during the same years the habilitation will be 
valid (4 years since the day of publication of 
results) – can be computed. All estimations 
here have to assume that, however, new 
habilitations will be given annually thus 
creating a chained longitudinal series of 
people who will have title to apply for 
associate and full professorships. Hence, 
larger numbers by sector in the projected year 
of 2016 (here given in Table 1) equals a 
stronger struggle for positions. 
As indicated in Table 1, the total of 
employees in Italian universities at the end of 
2012 was about 55,000 full time units. The 
pyramid is quite critical as the ratios among 
levels may indicate. In fact, for any associate 
professor there were almost 0.9 full 
professors, about the same amount as there are 
currently.  For assistant professors, who must 
all get the habilitation to improve their 
careers; there are less than three times their 
ranks compared to full professors (0.36). The 
associate professors level, though, is about 
two-thirds the level of assistant professors. 
Strong differences among scientific sectors, 
the actual sub-area communities of peers who 
are claimed to manage themselves through the 
new rule of habilitation, are therefore very 
clear. In some cases, there are more full 
professors than there are associates (ratio over 
1). For instance, in the epistemic community 
11C2 (Logic, History, and Philosophy of 
Science), the number of full professors is very 
near to the total of the other two layers 
summed together (0.78). Also, the ratio of 
associates and assistant professors does not 
reveal a scattered diversification in the 
scientific sectors that have been previously 
analyzed (as a range: max 1.23; min 0.45). 
Percentages of attained habilitation over the 
total number of applications can vary from 
less than 33% to 78%. This is a remarkable 
difference whose explanation is not easy to 
identify and whose reasoning may lie on the 
particular disciplines peculiarities or uses and 
interpretations of the new institution of 
habilitation.  
An interesting index is the ratio of 
habilitations given and the vacancies that each 
scientific sector will experience. To this 
regard, it can be seen that in many cases the 
habilitation of a sole wave are two or three 
times the vacancies of several years (for 
instance 3/C1). In other cases, the 
habilitations are more than 10 times the 
number of expected ceased positions (for 
instance in 2/B2). Considering the only real 
number possible
12
, the overall recruitment 
points for all university and sectors for 2013 
could be 445 points that can be used for more 
than 3,000 habilitations, thus the sectors here 
are only 20 out of 179. As a result, it is clear 
that even though there are huge differences 
between sectors, the winners of habilitations 
have only overcome a small hurdle; however, 
they have not accomplished their final 
endeavor. At the same time, the habilitation 
here seems to have become a system that 
signals who can enter (or improve their 
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 http://attiministeriali.miur.it/media/227960/tabella 
punti_organico_2013.pdf.  
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career) and more importantly, who cannot
13
. 
This seems especially true for those 
individuals who are not awarded with 
habilitation and thus have the minimum 
requisites to access the habilitation (e.g. you 
are not that bad, but we don’t want you 
neither as a competitor). This fact is relevant 
since the next competitions will be hosted 
locally and will not be on a national level. 
This procedure might also serve to reintroduce 
by the by default the antiquated practice of 
parochialism, with the innovation that a 
preselected list of competitors had already 
been excluded.  
The most critical point here is the 
impossibility to renew with the same pace of 
retirements these scientific communities and 
thus losing the opportunity of having a stable 
amount of young (as the fixed term assistant 
professorships are not many until now, the 
average age of new habilitated and 
consequently new associate professors will be 
probably not so young, and most probably 
already mature) cohorts. It must also be 
mentioned that the average age of most Italian 
scholars is already seriously high (medians for 
full, associate, and assistant professors are 
respectively: 60, 52, 44 with means of 58.9; 
                                                     
13
 People who tried to get the habilitation and failed 
are proscribed to participate to the same sector for 2 
consecutive years. Future attempts can so forth be 
done even though minimum requisites are reached 
without attaining the habilitation. But just for that, a 
message like this can be interpreted by the loser: “in 
the better of cases, mind that you are backward in the 
queue”. As recruitment in higher education system 
will be shortly describe, even this more optimistic 
interpretation equals to a de facto exclusion, unless 
priorities in the queue (one’s credit over other who 
could have won now, and hadn’t the chance to get a 
post meanwhile) wouldn’t change. In a logic of 
factions within a sector, this interpretation is possible.    
52.9; 45.4; Rossi 2012a). Thus, all this 
process of economic efficiency – the expected 
saving is not relevant since the pyramid has a 
bulge of people near mandatory retirement 
age and since traditionally the recruitment in 
Italy has witnessed long pauses coupled with 
large waves of open positions (Lissoni et al., 
2011) – probably will intensify a problem 
which is connected to brain drain and 
capability of an epistemic community to 
generate new internationally cutting edge 
knowledge. Even this latter implication is not 
included as a further analysis, it is essential 
since average age of human resources in 
research pertains the capability of epistemic 
communities to continue to exist (Pezzoni et 
al. 2012).  
4. DATA ANALYSES: WERE 
COMMITTEES A SOURCE OF 
MERITOCRACY? 
A First Overview. As previously described, 
the construction of the dataset required the 
researchers to divide the applicants amongst 
those who were already employed by the 
university from those who were hoping to 
obtain tenure.  
With this in mind, data in Table 2 helps 
reveal that the largest portion of employees in 
universities applied, especially if it is taken 
into account that full professors do not have a 
desire to compete for this award (percentage 
of applying employees in Italian universities 
is 78.98%).  
The impressive amount of applications 
among employees in universities and from 
other contexts (or with academic but more 
informal or weaker affiliation), possibly 
suggesting that the first wave might have been 
interpreted as an occasion to have a try.  
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Table 2 Description of the Universe: Employees in HEIs and Applicants  
 
 a.v. % 
a) Employees in HEIs not applying 34978 44.67 
 Full professors  13239 16.91 
b) Applying employees in HEIs 22538 28.78 
c) Applying employees in HEIs (without full professors) 22538 78.98 
d) Applying not employees in HEIs 20794 26.55 
Total (a+b+d) 78310 100.00 
 
Source: own elaboration on MIUR data. 
 
 
 
The persons who do not have a position as 
an employee in a university were revealed to 
have more of a propensity to apply to more 
than one sector/level.   
This is a quite reasonable occurrence in that 
their career paths may have not been 
solidified or their profile may not have 
perfectly matched those of the Italian 
academic system. As a result, more attempts 
and paths could have been chosen.  
Data in Table 3 illustrates that employees 
applying for a professorship in most cases 
tried only one sector with only three 
individuals applying to six different 
sectors/levels in the first level, and only one 
person applying in seven sectors among the 
second levels. In contrast, among the 
outsiders the tail is much longer and the 
percentages of those who limited themselves 
to only one submission is restricted when 
compared to their insider competitors.  
For example, 100 of the persons employed 
in Italian academia who participated in 
habilitation, 87.4 and 86.8 respectively, made 
only one application respectively for first and 
second level (Table 3).  
The same percentages for people who are 
not inside universities as employees were 81.2 
and 79.5, respectively. This can be considered 
a much more frequent propensity by external 
submitters to try more options in a tentative 
way, even though this does not imply weaker 
scientific standings.  
Understanding this implication is critical for 
the next step of the analysis in that the 
variable under discussion (insiders vs. 
outsiders) is introduced with the indicators of 
scientific production in order to test if, having 
same scientific productions, to be a part or not 
to be a part of academia is a good predictor of 
the outcome in question: attainment or no 
attainment of the habilitation. 
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Table 3 Number of Applications Submitted by Typology of Actors (Who Variable
14
) 
 and by Level of Application (Full Professors and Associate Professor) 
 
 
  first level second level 
# of application insiders outsiders Total insiders outsiders Total 
1 8.882 3.804 12.686 12.297 14.683 26.980 
 
87.42 81.26 85.48 86.82 79.52 82.69 
2 1.022 649 1.671 1.465 2.775 4.24 
 
10.06 13.86 11.26 10.34 15.03 12.99 
3 196 159 355 295 701 996 
 
1.93 3.4 2.39 2.08 3.8 3.05 
4 38 35 73 70 202 272 
 
0.37 0.75 0.49 0.49 1.09 0.83 
5 19 18 37 32 62 94 
 
0.19 0.38 0.25 0.23 0.34 0.29 
6 3 7 10 4 26 30 
 
0.03 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.14 0.09 
7  4 4 1 6 7 
 
 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 
8  1 1  5 5 
 
 0.02 0.01  0.03 0.02 
9  1 1  1 1 
 
 0.02 0.01  0.01 0.00 
11  1 1  2 2 
 
 0.02 0.01  0.01 0.01 
15  2 2  1 1 
 
 0.04 0.01  0.01 0.00 
18 
   
 1 1 
    
 0.01 0.00 
Total 22,538 20,794 43,332 22,538 20,794 43,332 
  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
Source: own elaboration on MIUR data. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
14
 For simplicity, labels of “who” variable are sometimes different as the meaning of this same variable can be 
of being “insiders” of “outsiders” of the system, or more technically but less shortly, employees and not-
employees in universities as researchers.  
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An examination of the data affirms that 
having the same standing of curriculum vitae, 
both an insider and an outsiders should have 
the same chances of being accredited as 
habilitated in that a recruiting agent – both an 
institution or a unit like a department – cannot 
claim in this step a question of compatibility 
in terms of research interests, previous 
partnerships, nor credits meant as relations 
between the candidates and the seniors.   
This is defined as political capital according 
to Pezzoni et al. (2012). In fact, the habilitated 
will not necessarily work with the members of 
the commission even though the committees 
can shape and influence the features of their 
epistemic community by giving or not giving 
this title. It is possible, then, to hypothesize 
that judgments based strictly only of scientific 
production indicators may not happen due to 
an enclosure mechanism that will favor those 
who are already inside the system at the 
expense of those who have not yet entered the 
system.  
These can mean then for those candidates 
with a strong standing in terms of scientific 
outputs, the result could even result in a 
change of employment from a non-Italian-
academic entity to the Italian university 
system itself.  
As previously stated, this exclusion 
mechanism can strengthen the informal 
institution of the queues of pupils listed by 
affiliation with their inbreeding processes 
(Pezzoni et al. 2012). Even so, habilitation 
could overcome this mechanism, replacing 
this practice with mere worthiness based on 
production or rethinking all this in a 
reconfiguration of the discipline based on the 
power of peers.  
 
This process cannot be tested in this study, 
however it is presented as a formal reminder 
to those people who already have a better 
position and/or are already with one step 
inside the system that they would somehow a 
receive a reasonable chance even though it is 
not coherent with the juridical system and the 
specific norms ruling the institution of 
habilitation. In fact, habilitation sees indices 
of individual performance as the main criteria 
of evaluation, yet the three indices it aims to 
use filters out people below some of the 
indicated good threshold while at the same 
time it is expected to filter in people over that 
same good threshold.  
Even though peer reviews of selected 
scientific outputs can affect the evaluation of 
candidates having the same numbers of 
outputs, and even though further credits in 
one’s curriculum vitae may be relevant, some 
descriptive statistics by insiders and outsiders 
are now indispensable.   
Equally important, the outsiders have higher 
standard deviations (with the exception of 
number of articles in top-ranked journals for 
science and humanities candidates: SD = 
4.023 for insiders and SD = 3.018 for 
outsiders) in all indicators of productivity, 
both in the hard sciences as well as in the 
social sciences and humanities (see Table 4). 
There is, however, a clear difference between 
candidates in scientific disciplines belonging 
to hard sciences (measured by bibliometric 
indicators) and the others.  
For instance, the outsiders in hard sciences 
have – just as a mean – better indicators, 
while in social sciences and humanities the 
evidence reveals the opposite: insiders have 
higher productivity in all three indicators.  
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Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of Productivity by Typology of Candidates  
(Insiders and Outsiders) 
 
 
Insiders Outsiders 
 
obs. mean S.D. obs. mean S.D. 
articles 2718 36.926 31.706 2591 37.203 34.2455 
citations 2717 49.998 66.749 2591 55.659 77.8591 
H index 2717 10.314 5.9263 2591 10.593 6.2509 
books 1027 3.051 2.4370 1320 2.831 3.3634 
chapters & articles 1027 21.339 16.1746 1320 17.051 25.8337 
articles in top ranked journals 1027 2.850 4.0235 1320 1.698 3.0177 
 
Source: own elaboration on MIUR data 
 
For this reason, the use of the variable who 
is quite problematic since the outsiders are in 
any case, even after splitting hard and soft 
sciences, a heterogeneous group whose 
composition cannot be analyzed easily. Both 
Figure 1 and Table 5 reveal the distribution of 
ages by insiders and outsiders.  Overall, 
outsiders are younger by 4 years and the first 
and last quartiles are also both younger by 3 
years. The outsiders’ distribution has an even 
higher kurtosis and a slightly higher skewness 
level.  
Literature about age and productivity is 
nonetheless an old preoccupation, especially 
in the United States. Clemente (1973) 
discussed findings dating back to the 1940s 
and 1950s affirming that early publications 
would be a good proxy of potential for a one’s 
career thus early publication is a sign of high 
career research outputs. More recently, 
Bozeman, Dietz, and Gaughan (2001) 
reported that by focusing only in hard 
sciences and technology laden professions, 
nowadays post-doctoral students (which 
would be here outsiders) are not the best 
potential candidates for research and 
development since career trajectories bring 
young adults to have their best laboratory 
experiences, even outside academia. To this 
regard, this differentiation between who is in 
and who is out academia may have some 
relevance even though the United States and 
Italy differ in many respects.  
Levin and Stephan (1991) reported that 
productivity cannot depend on age due to 
various scientific sectors and, especially, 
having different decades and different paces 
of productivity over a scientists' life course. 
The pace of accrued outputs is not constant 
and empirical evidence brought these 
researchers to highlight the relevant role of 
investments in research and development. 
Even though the numbers of scientific outputs 
were eligible only if no more than 10 years 
old (since 2003 until 2012 is included), the 
numbers of publications may be affected by 
the author’s younger age, especially for 
younger scholars trying to get the habilitation 
for associate positions
15
.  
                                                     
15
 Some Committees displayed information about 
personal years spent as research active, considering 
the starting age (first publication) minus official 
maternal/parternal leaves. Having no gender purposes 
here and making the regressions by scientific 
disciplines, this aspect was omitted.  
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Table 5 Descriptive Statistics of Age of Applicants by Typology of Candidates  
 
 
Insiders Outsiders 
Obs.  3427   3582  
25%  40   37  
Median  46   42  
75%  52   49  
Mean  46.604   43.280  
S.D.  8.0047   7.9062  
Skewness  0.39138   0.51002  
Kurtosis  2.39577   2.56251  
 
Source: own elaboration on MIUR data 
 
 
 
For these reasons, and even considering the 
reduced availability of information for this 
dataset, age was use to check (through a 
Heckman two steps treat) the insider/outsider 
variable, with more recent findings reporting 
concerns between the links of age, cohorts, 
and periods tested in science productivity 
(Hall, Mairesse, & Turner, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration from MIUR dataset 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of candidates by age and insiders (labeled 1) and outsiders (labeled 0) 
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What really matter to get the habilitation? 
Tables 6a and 6b provide the final stage of 
this analysis for this study. The identities of 
applicants, labeled as who, is inserted into a 
full model of several regressions with the 
three indicators along with the who variable 
that was previously treated for age. Indicators 
of productivity are used as they appear from 
the personal folders of the candidates: 
continuous variables measuring the 
quantitative/qualitative production of 
scientific production.  
Committees had to check if the medians
16
 
were reached or not in order to decide. This 
resulted in a person being judged habilitated 
only if two of the three indicators had been 
reached or if performance indicators 
surpassed the medians among the sector in 
question.  
These indicators included those candidates 
whose production over the last 10 years does 
not overtake neither one median of his/her 
sector or should be awarded with habilitation 
only if other criteria (always publicly 
expressed by the committees, but they refer to 
a peer review job sustained by the further 
credits detailed in the candidates curriculum 
vitae) did not lead to a different inducement. 
Hence, the hypothesis concerning scientific 
production as being not the only predictor of 
                                                     
16
 “Medians” turned recently to become ynonimous 
of “thresholds” in Italian debate. The national 
Agency for evaluation and accreditation published 
these values by scientific sector before the release of 
results: http://www.anvur.org/index.php?option=com 
_content&view=article&id=253:asn-indicatori-e-relat 
ive-mediane-it&catid=13:sitoit&Itemid=314&lang=it  
These values as said are subjected to peer review 
made by the members of commissions and could be 
contracticted.  
attainment of habilitation does indeed deserve 
a more in depth analysis
17
.  
However, I would caution that an apparent 
identical hypothesis could be as follows: 
people who are already in academia as 
employees may be successful if just minimum 
threshold are covered but are not so strong in 
relative terms when compared with other 
scholars.  
This second version differs from the original 
hypotheses in that it excludes who is, 
apparently from indicators, good but is not 
recognized as eligible to compete to become 
part of the community.  
An additional consideration thing is though 
must be given to those eligible people who are 
barely good, but are recognized as already 
have obtained some position to enter as a peer 
in the academic community.  
Last, the theoretical assumption here is that 
the Italian system, even though deeply 
reformed by the last general Law, remains 
regarding the career ladder a regular 
employee track and did not opt to change into 
a contract track or a tenure track (Enders, 
2001).  
To this regard, tables 6a and 6b helps to 
identify which committees discriminated or 
did not discriminate against candidates by 
their current positions.  
                                                     
17
 At the same time, an apparent identical hypothesis 
could be as follows: people who are already in 
academia as employees may be successful if just 
minimum threshold are covered but are not so strong 
in relative terms if compared with other scholars. 
This second version differs because one thing is to 
exclude who is, apparently from indicators, good but 
is not recognized as eligible to compete to become 
part of the community; other thing is to let consider 
eligible people who are barely good but are 
recognized as already somewhere in the queue to 
enter as a peer the community.   
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Table 6a – Logistic regressions for habilitation attained: models with scientific production 
indicators plus status of “insiders/outsiders” dummy variable treated by Heckman 
two steps by age (bibliometric scientific sectors) 
 
  
obs. model Articles Citations H_index Insiders/outsiders age 
 
label of sector 
  
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. 
1_A4_1 Mathematical 
Physics 
144 0.9389 0.000 (0.002) -0.002 (0.015) 0.005 (0.015) -0.176 (0.740) 0.019 (0.013) 
1_A4_2 231 0.0619 0.003 (0.003) -0.006*** (0.002) 0.028 (0.019) -0.958 (0.749) 0.028** (0.013) 
2_B1_1 Applied Physics 
of matter 
230 0.0000 0.002* (0.001) -0.000 (0.004) 0.022** (0.009) -0.297 (0.239) 0.052*** (0.013) 
2_B1_2 505 0.0000 0.001 (0.001) -0.001** (0.001) 0.046*** (0.008) -0.027 (0.156) 0.050*** (0.010) 
2_B2_1 Theoretical 
Physics of 
matter 
139 0.0000 0.002** (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.025** (0.242) -0.326 (0.242) 0.056*** (0.016) 
2_B2_2 330 0.0000 0.003 (0.002) 0.001 (0.007) 0.036*** (0.009) -0.103 (0.303) 0.036*** (0.012) 
3_C1_1 Organic 
Chemistry 
104 0.0000 0.004* (0.002) -0.000 (0.001) 0.036* (0.019) -0.407 (0.726) 0.040 (0.025) 
3_C1_2 205 0.0000 -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 0.072*** (0.015) -0.273 (0.466) 0.030* (0.015) 
6_D3_1 Blood diseases, 
Oncology and 
Rheumatology 
121 0.0000 0.002** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.034*** (0.009) 0.164 (0.275) 0.049*** (0.018) 
6_D3_2 306 0.0286 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.035 (0.023) -4.240 (13.718) 0.003 (0.010) 
6_E1_1 Cardiovascular 
and Thoracic 
Surgery 
96 0.1610 -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.028 (0.025) -1.031 (1.280) 0.023 (0.018) 
6_E1_2 193 0.9821 0.003 (0.019) -0.002 (0.021) 0.052 (0.201) -16.743 (144.037) 0.002 (0.013) 
7_H1_1 Anatomy and 
Physiological 
Veterinary 
41 0.0000 0.002 (0.006) -0.006* (0.004) 0.109*** (0.022) -0.153 (0.846) 0.043 (0.048) 
7_H1_2 59 0.0000 0.013*** (0.006) -0.011* (0.006) 0.133*** (0.034) 
-0.645 (0.497) 0.053 (0.030) 
7_H3_1 Infectious and 
Parasitic 
Diseases of 
Animals 
33 0.6382 -0.001 (0.006) -0.001 (0.004) 0.054 (0.054) 2.765 (4.567) -0.022 (0.037) 
7_H3_2 77 0.0088 0.002 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) 0.039* (0.022) 0.496 (1.039) 0.018 
(0.020) 
7_H5_1 Clinic Surgery 
and Animal 
Obstetrical 
29 0.0828 0.015 (0.009) -0.006 (0.010) 0.060 (0.071) 0.056 (1.511) 0.056 (0.069) 
7_H5_2 50 0.1337 0.002 (0.015) -0.025 (0.028) 0.195* (0.105) 2.403 (2.893) -0.024 (0.032) 
8_A1_1 Hydrology, 
Hydraulics, 
Hydraulic and 
Nautical 
Buildings 
63 0.0000 0.015** (0.007) 0.004 (0.004) -0.009 (0.031) 1.138*** (0.362) 0.115*** (0.039) 
8_A1_2 138 0.0000 0.006 (0.007) -0.005 (0.005) 0.082*** (0.028) -0.080 (0.198) 0.103*** (-0.022) 
8_B3_1 Building 
techniques 
60 0.7700 0.011 (0.029) 0.003 (0.029) 0.049 (0.127) -5.131 (22.697) -0.006 (0.030) 
8_B3_2 94 0.0011 -0.007 (0.007) 0.00 (0.007) 0.097*** (0.032) 1.242 (1.453) 0.018 (-0.021) 
9_H1_1 Elaboration of 
Information 
Systems 
260 0.0011 -0.006* (0.004) -0.000 (0.002) 0.064*** (0.023) 1.863 (3.677) 0.007 (-0.014) 
9_H1_2 412 0.0000 -0.006** (0.003) -0.003** (0.001) 0.083*** (0.013) -0.227 (0.631) 0.019* (0.012) 
 
Source: own elaboration on MIUR data 
* p<0.10 
** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01 
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Table 6b. Logistic Regressions for Habilitation Attained: Models with Scientific Production 
Indicators Plus Status of Insiders/Outsiders Dummy Variable 
(not-Bibliometric epistemic communities)  
 
    
# books  # articles or chapters 
# articles in top-
ranked journals 
insiders/outsiders age 
  
obs. model coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. 
11_A1_1 
Medieval History 
49 0.9769 0.004 (0.024) -0.001 (0.005) -0.012 (0.027) 0.473 (0.639) 0.047 (0.032) 
11_A1_2 172 0.0000 0.010 (0.014) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.053*** (0.017) 1.396 (2.302) 0.009 (0.015) 
11_A3_1 
Contemporary History 
116 0.0000 -0.002 (0.011) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.073*** (0.020) 0.559* (0.330) 0.037** (0.016) 
11_A3_2 425 0.0000 0.016** (0.008) 0.005*** (0.002) 0.119*** (0.014) 0.002 (0.263) 0.028*** (0.008) 
11_A4_1 Book and Documents 
Sciences; Religion 
Sciences 
111 0.0006 -0.007 (0.015) 0.000 (0.002) 0.072*** 0.003 -2.498 0.000 0.052*** (0.017) 
11_A4_2 322 0.0000 0.005 (0.009) 0.008*** (0.002) 0.044*** (0.011) 1.074 (0.808) 0.016 (0.016) 
11_C2_1 Logic, History and 
Philosophy of Science 
85 0.0001 0.002 (0.014) -0.001 (0.001) 0.047*** (0.011) 0.633 (0.583) 0.031* (0.018) 
11_C2_2 205 0.0000 0.011 (0.014) 0.005** (0.002) 0.082*** (0.012) 1.386 (1.087) 0.017 (0.012) 
11_C4_1 Aesthetics, Languages 
Philosophy 
69 0.0008 0.010 (0.013) -0.002 (0.002) 0.071*** (0.016) 0.241 (0.415) 0.045** (0.023) 
11_C4_2 226 0.0002 0.020** (0.010) 0.005** (0.002) 0.033*** (0.012) 1.020 (0.889) 0.013 (0.011) 
12_B1_1 Commercial and 
Nautical Law 
57 0.1085 0.036 (0.051) 0.005 (0.007) 0.005 (0.015) 2.183* (1.240) -0.036 (0.026) 
12_B1_2 186 0.3906 -0.010 (0.017) -0.002 (0.004) 0.013 (0.011) 1.786 (1.303) -0.020 (0.016) 
13_A5_1 
Econometrics 
37 0.9795 -0.074 (0.425) -0.009 (0.038) 0.053 (0.102) -7.097 (70.301) 0.003 (0.026) 
13_A5_2 60 0.1748 -0.048 (0.075) -0.000 (0.008) 0.041* (0.022) 0.348 (1.576) 0.014 (0.023) 
14_C1_1 Genera, Juridical and 
Political Sociology 
117 0.0000 0.001 (0.014) 0.007*** (0.002) 0.028*** (0.008) 0.027 (0.354) 0.052** (0.021) 
14_C1_2 356 0.0000 -0.011 (0.008) 0.000 (0.002) 0.034*** (0.006) 0.351 (0.811) 0.008 (0.010) 
 
Source: own elaboration on MIUR data 
* p<0.10 
** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01 
 
All the three indicators of productivity as 
well as the who variable were used regardless 
of the extent to which these indicators were 
above or under the medians for each 
candidate. The dummy variables regarding 
being insiders or outsiders as previously 
explained is part of the model with the four 
predictors. Tables 6 are split to differentiate 
the hard sciences from the soft sciences. 
Committees under investigations are 40: 20 
scientific sectors by two levels.  Full 
professors are identified as (_1) and associates 
as (_2). Additionally, eight of the sectors are 
in social sciences and humanities with the 
remaining number of sectors belonging to the 
hard sciences. As identified in the tables, 15 
of the 24 models in the hard sciences have a 
statistically significant difference whereas 
nine models do not show a statistically 
significant difference. In 11 committees, there 
is a statistically significant difference 
compared to the other 5 committees that did 
not reveal statistically significant difference. 
The non-bibliometric sectors revealed similar 
results.  
In the hard sciences, 14 committees out of 
24 have the normalized H index of Hirsch as a 
good predictor of getting the habilitation (as 
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expected, the association is always the higher 
the index, the higher the probability to get the 
habilitation): 10 times at p <0.01 level. Thus, 
seven times the number of articles can predict 
the outputs of attainment of habilitation. In 
two of these cases, the association is negative 
(Elaboration of Information Systems, both 
levels). In only five times did the number of 
gross citations help predict the phenomena, 
and in four cases the coefficient was negative.  
The only positive coefficient that was 
significant was at the 0.01 level 
(Mathematical Physics, associate level). In 
only one case, (Hydrology, Hydraulics, 
Hydraulic and Nautical Buildings, full 
professor level), the insider/outsider variable 
had a significant and strong coefficient, with 
the advantage of insiders.  
Overall, conjointly 26 times did an indicator 
which is formally part of the decision making 
predict the verdict of habilitations. Also, only 
in 7 committees predictors were not found. 
Generally, the H index looks to be, in most of 
the cases, a stable and affordable predictor for 
getting the habilitation.   
In the social sciences (Table 6b), only three 
committees are left without predictors 
(Econometrics, first level; Commercial and 
Nautical Law, second level; Medieval 
History, first level). Among those with sound 
predictors, 12 times the high number of 
articles published in top-ranked journals is a 
predictor for the attainment of the habilitation. 
Furthermore, seven times the number of other 
articles and chapters in books is associated 
positively with this outcome. In only two 
committees were the numbers of books 
somehow relevant. In any case, even in social 
sciences and humanities, that cannot have 
bibliometric indicators, an analogous 
hierarchy between the three indicators was 
noted: articles in top-ranked journals (H index 
for hard sciences) are better than articles and 
chapters in books (number of citations in hard 
sciences), though they subsequently are better 
than the number of books (number of articles). 
In both the hard sciences and not-bibliometric 
sector the insider/outsider does not play any 
role, expect for the few sectors that should be 
analyzed in more detail.  
5. CONCLUSIONS AND 
DISCUSSIONS ABOUT 
HABILITATION 
The Italian academic system in the 
recruitment issue was described as a "multiple 
processes of negotiations" (Nelken, 2009, 
p.?), even though recent evidence about 
institutional reforms, for instance the role of 
evaluation, shows that recruitment is changing 
into a differently bargained process (Reale & 
Marini, 2013). This new relation is based on a 
maussian gift (Fassari, 2009) or the political 
power (Pezzoni et al. 2012) and is very 
powerful, but this perspective tells only a part. 
Why a big don professor should show such 
generosity has long been the subject of 
debate? To some extent, it’s a matter of 
showing his/her power to his/her peers, as an 
indirect index of strength. It is indeed even a 
question of letting go of one's group at the 
expense of others. It is, last but not least, a 
pay-back for many services and little jobs the 
junior already had given. In fact, Nelken 
(2009) affirms, showing in depth knowledge 
of the Italian system, especially of social 
sciences in which old professors must provide 
evidence to be able to give a post in order to 
have someone under them do many regular 
jobs (i.e. supervise undergraduates, 
accomplish minor phases of research, etc.). 
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The asymmetrical relations beyond this 
reciprocal obligations and its parochialism are 
not even a new issues in these studies (Perotti, 
2002), nor just an Italian practice, since 
inbreeding is an old issue and not just an 
Italian one (Combes, Linnemer, & Visser, 
2008), often intertwined with the stratification 
of universities and departments (McGee, 
1960; Kirchmeyer, 2005). In any case, in this 
traditional framework the role of the 
habilitation cannot already be defined clearly.  
It must be said that, despite the Italian 
public opinion and even scholars’ common 
debate about Italian higher education, to have 
a sponsor and to have a career in universities 
is nothing but a regular matter (Kyrchmeyer, 
2005; Musselin, 2004; Reskin, 1979). In fact, 
there are contexts as well rules to prevent bad 
collegiality (Enders, 2001). Even though in 
the Italian system internal market (Musselin, 
2005) is formally denied, the allegations of 
parochialism and nepotism by protégé haven’t 
ceased so far. This first wave let emerge a 
further problem, which pertains more with 
legitimation of the evaluation itself. Perhaps 
the words by Bourdieu (1975) can more 
eloquently summarize the phenomenon:  
In a highly autonomous scientific field, a 
particular producer cannot expect 
recognition of the value of this products 
("reputation", "prestige", "authority", 
"competence", etc.) from anyone except 
other producers, who, being his 
competitors too, are those least inclined to 
grant recognition without discussion and 
scrutiny. This is true de facto: only 
scientists involved in the area have the 
means of symbolically appropriating his 
work and assessing its merits. And it is 
also true de jure; the scientist who appeals 
to an authority outside the field cannot fail 
to incur discredit (p. 23). 
It can also be said that further discussion is 
mandatory. In fact, some habilitation 
committees have been sued formally (appeals 
by not-habilitation awarded to regional 
administrative courts – namely TARs – have 
already occurred and have already been 
rejected) and informally (through tough 
debates within some epistemic communities 
or scientific disciplines, which is quite the 
overlapped translation of this concept
18
). An 
analysis of these data cannot cause one to 
shrink from some discussion of the topic. 
Following the suggestion in Bourdieu’s 
passage, usually, scientific communities 
should react harshly to appeals to external 
actors, like appealing for justice to tribunal or 
exposing one’s case to punish the system in a 
pillory. One explanation to these phenomena 
may concern cultural aspects while others 
may argue that some traits of the weak state’s 
institutions play a role. At least, the possibility 
of a dominant civil servants’ ethos (where 
achieving to climb the career ladder is 
expected to happen just by seniority) to 
respect of those more typical of scholars 
(based on prestige accrued through scientific 
outcomes and intellectual acknowledgement) 
could be envisaged.  Explanations of this 
phenomenon go beyond the possibilities of 
this work.  
                                                     
18
 A comprehensive and up to dated list of both these 
sort of appeals and debates are listed here: 
http://www.roars.it/online/documentazione-asn-e-
vqr/. In some cases, such as in sector 11A4 (Book 
and Documents Sciences; Religion Sciences, here 
anayzed and among those with found predictors), the 
case was brought in the national Parliamant for an 
interrogation concerning the procedures and criteria 
adopted by the Commission.  
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Whatever the cause, the new habilitation 
doesn’t seem, especially in some not-
bibliometric sectors, to be a pacific exercise of 
evaluation because the appeals and the debate 
are too massive to be banished as marginal 
facts. In fact, allegations and critiques already 
emerged and these show that this new 
institution may have weak points besides its 
slowness. A specific, not statistical, example 
is the case of pro-veritate
19
 judges in 11A4 
sector. In this sector, pro-veritate was 
appealed to much more often if compared to 
all other sectors here taken into account. 
Generally, this extra judge was practically a 
mere exception
20
, while in 11A4 it became 
quite a systematic way to give – always to the 
same person – the power to decide. This looks 
to reduce the collegial negotiations to a 
personal domain over a whole community. In 
any case, this mentioned example only 
reinforces the need to pursue further 
investigations upon careers, recruitment and 
evaluation in higher education.  
If the system of concorsi could have been 
seen as a panel game within the epistemic 
community that could regulate itself any time 
a concorso happened (with the capability to 
give and change meta-rules in the mid long 
run), habilitation looks to have an interesting 
role because it is managed by few people and 
just one or two persons are able to don’t 
afford the habilitation (committees are 
                                                     
19
 Pro veritate evaluations can be freely appealed by 
the committees on pursuit of Law 240/2010 
(Gelmini), art. 16 (dedicated to habilitation), 
paragraph 3, letter (i). These evaluations to be valid 
have to be published integrally and with authors.   
20
 Over 12628 application here analyzed so far, only 
38 times this appeal happened; in both levels of 11A4 
it happened 37 times: 18 times for the second level 
(5.6% of all applications in its sector) and 19 times 
for the first level (17.3% of all applications).  
composed of 5 members and to get the 
habilitations a candidate must get a positive 
evaluation from at least 4 members). Being a 
one-step more for recruitment, habilitation 
wouldn’t give more efficiency to the system 
but could give a contribution for the overall 
effectiveness of the recruitment process.  
Summing up, the way the habilitation has 
worked could be subjected to further analyses 
and techniques, included different 
approaches
21
. These data, however, look to be 
quite sound to let say that the indicators of 
productivity, especially those measuring 
better the quality of research made, let emerge 
in quite all the committees here studied, a 
reasonable evaluations. Unfortunately very 
little can be said about the committees were 
the variables here used don’t explain the 
outcome of the attainment of habilitation. As a 
matter of fact the habilitation tries to 
reformulate the human and élite component of 
the tribes of scholars (Becher &Trowler, 
2001) by allowing in the next steps the local 
competitions for permanent positions to have 
pre-selected pools of candidates, relying 
implicitly to filter out poor candidates, 
included those already with permanent 
positions (assistant professors and associate 
professors) and here define outsiders but 
notwithstanding with some years already 
committed to research and teaching in tertiary 
education. 
So for, the change from a collegial into a 
more managerial pattern, as seen before in 
other contexts (Harle, Muller-Camen, & 
Collina, 2004), cannot be considered yet 
                                                     
21
 A not suited approach here is the gender one, 
which was already addressed for the analysis of 
women’s careers in higher education (Bagilhole, 
Goode, 2001; Duberleya, Cohen, 2010; van den 
Brink, Benschop, Jansen, 2010). 
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accomplished. If a paradigmatic change will 
happen, it would be more probably due to the 
combination of the role of habilitation with 
other factors such as accountability, 
evaluation rationales, and quality assurance. 
All of these factors whose effectiveness by 
time shall be studied further with more data 
and especially with some longitudinal 
evidence under investigations.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Sources. Full detail information can be downloaded as in the first case, or pasted from drop-
down menu in the following two cases.  
 
 
Matrix [A]: http://cercauniversita.cineca.it/php5/docenti/cerca.php observations are individuals  
Matrix [B]: http://abilitazione.miur.it/public/pubblicacandidati.php observations are single 
applications (age and gender can be grasped here or from next source) 
Vectors of scientific outputs and results of habilitations: 
http://abilitazione.miur.it/public/pubblicarisultati.php observations are single applications  
 
 
 
 
List of variables in [F] N=78310:  
ID name     
SSC (358 variables)        dummy (attainment; not attainment) 
Who          applying insiders; not-applying insiders; applying outsiders 
Ruolo          positions of the insider in academia  
Number of applications made   
Scientific area of employee       1-14 
Number of articles       continuous  
Number of citations       continuous 
H Index         continuous 
Number of books        continuous 
Number of chapters and articles      continuous 
Number of articles in top ranked journals     continuous 
Pro-veritate judgement        dummy 
Sex   
Age  
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Figure 1A. Diagram of construction of the database 
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